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Designing a Legal Vehicle for Social Enterprises: 





Social entrepreneurship is at the juncture of creative capitalism and social 
innovation.  It aims at combining the best of two sectors, and thus is cramped in the 
traditional vehicles designed for either world in isolation.  Although the social bottom line 
of these enterprises can usually meet the broad charitable purpose requirement of the 
Internal Revenue Code, tax-exempt vehicles have proven to be unable to hose the financial 
one.  Conversely, the advantages of for-profits stem from their flexibility, but their failure 
to receive funding from tax-exempts and the lack of a social enterprise brand have made it 
necessary to design new vehicles. 
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I INTRODUCTION: SOCIETAL INNOVATION AND THE DEFINITION OF 
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
 The Call for Creative Capitalism 
In his closing comments at the Stanford commencement in 2005, Steve Jobs called 
on the graduates to “Stay Hungry.  Stay Foolish.” 1   Turning negative adjectives into 
positive ones, his address was an encouragement to innovate, a wish that graduates be eager 
to make unconventional decisions.  This vision fits what, by nature, entrepreneurs are 
expected to do: think outside of the box to create something new.  About two years later, 
in his commencement speech at Harvard University, Bill Gates pushed for “a more creative 
capitalism” that would “stretch the reach of market forces so that more people can make a 
profit, or at least make a living, serving people who are suffering from the worst 
inequities.”2 
Studies reveal that U.S. corporations allocate billions of dollars to social causes: 
the “Giving in Numbers: 2012 Edition” survey, based on data from 214 companies, 
including 62 of the top 100 companies in the Fortune 500, reveals that the sum of 
contributions across all its respondents in 2011 was $19.9 billion (in cash and product 
giving). 3   These contributions are expressions of the theory of corporate social 
responsibility, “a broad concept that describes a business's obligation to interact with 
society in a socially responsible way.”4  However, corporate social responsibility treats the 
contribution to public good as incidental to the profitmaking activity, whereas Bill Gates 
suggests that companies could primarily and profitably promote social causes. 
Such a use of business strategies to promote public welfare purposes has 
increasingly been referred to as social entrepreneurship, and in many ways it has been 
responding to both of these exhortations long before they were formulated.  As early as in 
1963, Bill Drayton began to entertain the model of change that Bill Gates praised in 2007, 
a model that “combine[s] the pragmatic and results-oriented methods of a business 
entrepreneur with the goals of a social reformer.”5  In 1980, he structured this commitment 
through Ashoka, a nonprofit that “aims to find change-making leaders around the world, 
provide them with support and modest ‘social venture capital,’” thus creating a 
“community for people seeking to make change, encouraging them to inspire, mentor and 
challenge each other to come up with the best ideas in social innovation.”6  In 1974, 
Muhammad Yunus started giving out “micro-loans” to the poor in Bangladesh, helping 
them create “the spark of personal initiative and enterprise necessary to pull themselves 
                                                        
1 Steve Jobs, CEO, Apple Computer, Commencement Address at Stanford University (June 12, 2005) 
(transcript available at http://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/june15/jobs-061505.html). 
2 Bill Gates, Chairman, Microsoft Inc., Commencement Address at Harvard University (June 7, 2007) 
(transcript available at http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2007/06/remarks-of-bill-gates-harvard 
commencement-2007/). 
3 Giving in numbers 2012 Edition 4, COMM. ENCOURAGING CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY, 
http://cecp.co/pdfs/giving_in_numbers/GIN2012_finalweb.pdf (last visited Sep. 22, 2013). 
However, when considered as a percentage of the profits of these companies, these contributions 
are a modest commitment to social welfare. 
4 Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Institutions: Beyond Dodd-Frank, BANKING 
& FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., January 2012, at 13, 14 (2012). 
5 Caroline Hsu, Entrepreneur For Social Change, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Oct. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051031/31drayton.htm. 
6 Tom Dawkins, Huffington Post Gamechangers Poll Recognizes Ashoka Community, ASHOKA.ORG (Nov. 5, 
2009), https://www.ashoka.org/story/6142. 
2013] DESIGNING A LEGAL VEHICLE FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISES: 103 
 AN ISSUE SPOTTING EXERCISE 
out of poverty.”7  In 1983, he carried on, founding the Grameen Bank – literally “the 
Village Bank” – on principles of trust and solidarity.8  
Since the 1980s, this phenomenon has dramatically expanded as the traditional 
division of the society into three sectors – for-profit, government and nonprofit – began to 
seem unable to adequately address the broad array of social challenges.  Social 
entrepreneurship has led to the emergence of a fourth sector, somewhere in between the 
for-profit and the nonprofit sectors.9 
 A Lack of Uniform Definition 
Social entrepreneurship has been thriving for four decades and is increasingly 
recognized as a game changer – the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded jointly to 
Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank "for their efforts to create economic and social 
development from below".10Yet so far it has no legal definition.  Thus, it is the social 
entrepreneurship movement itself that elaborated its description.  Consequently, it is 
commonly acknowledged that the topic lacks “a clear and concise definition” as 
“[c]onservative or exclusionary classifications of social entrepreneurship vary widely from 
publication to publication . . . .”11  In 2008, Paul C. Light noted that recent scholarship had 
offered an inventory of more than 20 definitions for social enterprise.12  Yet, the Social 
Enterprise Alliance’s contribution to the definition of social entrepreneurship is of 
particular interest, since it is a “membership organization for the diverse and rapidly 
growing social enterprise sector in North America.”13  It defines social enterprises as 
“businesses whose primary purpose is the common good” and that use “the methods and 
disciplines of business and the power of the marketplace to advance their social, 
environmental and human justice agendas.”14  
Pursuant to this definition, social enterprises have three characteristics that 
distinguish them from other types of businesses, nonprofits and government agencies: they 
directly address social needs, the common good is their primary purpose, and their 
                                                        
7 Biography of Dr. Muhammad Yunus, GRAMEEN.COM, http://grameen.com/index.php?option=com_content& 
task=view&id=329&Itemid=363 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
8 Id. (“In Bangladesh today, Grameen has 2,564 branches, with 19,800 staff serving 8.29 million borrowers 
in 81,367 villages.  On any working day Grameen collects an average of $1.5 million in 
weekly installments.  Of the borrowers, 97% are women and over 97% of the loans are paid 
back, a recovery rate higher than any other banking system.  Grameen methods are applied in 
projects in 58 countries, including the US, Canada, France, The Netherlands and Norway.”). 
9 See Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 340 
(2009); see also Alissa Mickels, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of 
a For-Benefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 271, 279 (2009). 
10 The Nobel Peace Prize 2006, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laure  
ates/2006/ (last visited Sep. 22, 2013).  Other examples of this public recognition 
include Business Week 's annual publication of i ts l ist  of America's Most Promising 
Social Entrepreneurs since 2008.  See John Tozzi, America's Most Promising Social Entrepreneurs 
2011, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jul. 19, 2011), available at http://www.businessweek.com/smal 
lbiz/content/jun2011/sb20110621_158462.htm. 
11 Ryan J. Gaffney, Hype and Hostility for Hybrid Companies: A Fourth Sector Case Study, 5 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 329, 332 (2012) (quoting Matthew F. Doeringer, Fostering Social 
Enterprise: A Historical and International Analysis, 20 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 292 (2010)). 
12 PAUL C. LIGHT, THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 3 (2008). 
13 The Case for Social Enterprise Alliance, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://www.se-alliance.org/why# 
whatwereallabout (last visited Sep. 22, 2013). 
14 Id. 
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commercial activity is a strong revenue driver.15  Such a broad definition encompasses 
enterprises addressing needs “as diverse as human ingenuity.”16 
Whereas this definition conveys a broad understanding of social entrepreneurship, 
it also emphasizes a characteristic that is essential to its legal analysis: “unlike traditional 
business models, any profit that flows to individuals is incidental to the social enterprise’s 
primary purpose.”17  Indeed, in the United States the definition of social entrepreneurship 
“focus[es] on generating income for organizations that provide services typically thought 
of as being provided by the nonprofit sector.”18  This focus reflects what has come to be 
called the double bottom-line of social enterprises: they further the dual and co-equal 
purposes of making profit and contributing to the public good.19  Neither of these co-
objectives is incidental to the other, 20  hence the idea of a double bottom-line.  
Consequently, social entrepreneurs seek both an economic return on investment and a 
social one.  
The very difficulty social entrepreneurs face relates to this double bottom-line 
return.  Part II explains why tax-exempt nonprofits do not meet the needs of this peculiar 
business model.  Part III then delineates the effect of the so-called shareholder primacy 
doctrine on social enterprises that adopt a corporate form.  Part IV then develops the 
governance and funding challenges that stem from the capitalization of a for-profit social 
enterprise.  Part V subsequently outlines the main attempts to adapt the traditional vehicles 
to these challenges.  Part VI finally describes the main hybrid vehicles, which try to 
combine the two sectors in a single entity.  
II THE CHARITABLE NONPROFIT: A VEHICLE UNSUITED FOR THE 
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE BUSINESS MODEL 
This part first offers an overview of the business model that social enterprises 
usually pursue.  Then it outlines why traditional tax-exempt nonprofits fail to address this 
business plan.  
 Characterizing Social Entrepreneurship from Its Business Model 
The characteristics of social enterprise business models pertain to their double 
bottom line.  First of all, they are organized for the primary purpose of addressing a social 
issue.  This mission is not subsidiary to their business activity; it is its very motive.  Hence, 
social outcomes are as important as economic objectives in the decision-making process.  
This first element is essential to determine whether a tax-exempt vehicle might be used, 
and it distinguishes social enterprises’ business models from those of traditional for-profit 
enterprises, in which an incidental part of the enterprise’s activity may be allocated to the 
public good.  
                                                        
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal Form for Social Enterprise, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
283, 289 (2012). 
18 Matthew F. Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International Analysis, 20 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT'L L. 291, 292 (2009-2010). 
19 See Linda O. Smiddy, Symposium Introduction: Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other 
Developments in Social Entrepreneurship,  35 VT. L. REV. 3, 5 (2010). 
20 See Briana Cummings, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote the Public 
Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 581-82 (2012); see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Symposium: 
Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other Developments in Social Entrepreneurship, 
Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 105 (“[A]chieving and 
governing truly blended enterprise means consistently serving two masters."). 
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Secondly, the social enterprise activity in and of itself addresses a social issue: the 
business is part of the solution to the social problem, as opposed to a mere fundraising tool.  
For instance, Generation Water,  a Los Angeles-based social enterprise, furthers three aims: 
restoring landscape and promoting water saving, preparing young adults with the skills 
necessary to lead the transition to a sustainable economy, and creating economic value 
through these social missions. 21  The business itself is therefore favoring the development 
of a sustainable economy.  This second element distinguishes social enterprises from tax-
exempt enterprises that use business-like activities merely to provide funds for their 
charitable undertakings, 22  although tax-exempts sometimes further charitable goals 
through such activities.23  
A third characteristic of social enterprises relates to the way they finance their 
activity.  While traditional tax-exempts rely mostly on philanthropy, social enterprises aim 
at sustaining their activity through earned income. 24   This financial self-sufficiency 
guarantees a consistent cash flow, whereas grants and donations can vary greatly from one 
year to another.  Nonetheless, even though the objective of social enterprises is to become 
self-sufficient with earned income, they have to explore other funding opportunities during 
start-up and expansion stages.  
The question of where social entrepreneurs expect to find their capital for a given 
venture is a central one.  If they contemplate charitable contributions and grants, a tax-
exempt entity might be considered – alone or in combination with a for-profit.  However, 
because they expect to create economic value through their activity, social entrepreneurs 
usually also want to access capital from market investors.25  In such a situation, social 
entrepreneurs may need to form a for-profit – alone or in combination with a tax-exempt.  
Incidental to this question is the determination of the economic return that founders 
or investors expect from the venture.  A tax-exempt organization, in and of itself, does not 
allow founders a share in the profit, other than in form of a reasonable salary.26  Therefore, 
since social enterprises’ business plans usually include equity-based financing, implying 
at the very least equity distributions and liquidity, a for-profit must be part of the legal 
structure.  
Consequently, social enterprises should be financially flexible in order to obtain 
grants and donations as well as traditional equity-based or bank funding.  Further, this 
financial flexibility also allows social enterprises to access a peculiar source of capital 
known as “impact investments,” which are investments made “into companies, 
organizations, and funds with the intention to generate measurable social and 
environmental impact alongside a financial return.”27  As a result, social entrepreneurs 
                                                        
21 Our Story, GENERATION WATER, http://www.generationwater.org/meet/story (last visited Sep. 22, 2013). 
22 See, e.g., Raz, supra note 17, at 291 ("If the business exists solely to provide funding to the organization, then it 
is not a social enterprise. However, if the business is essential to solving the problem that the 
organization aims to tackle, then it could be considered a social enterprise."). 
23 See infra Part II.C. 
24 See, e.g., Raz, supra note 17, at 294 (“Once a social enterprise establishes itself, if it is successful as a business, 
the revenue it generates will cover it costs.”). 
25 See, e.g., John Walker, A Financing Gap, ECHOING GREEN, http://www.echoinggreen.org/blog/financing-
gap (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
26 This results from the inurement rule and private benefit doctrines.  See infra Part II.C. 
27 Global Impact Investing Network: Impact Investing, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, 
http://www.thegiin.org/cgi-bin/iowa/investing/index.html (last visited Sep. 22, 2013). 
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must search for legal forms or combinations adaptable enough not to deprive them of any 
funding opportunity.  
A fourth element of the business model pertains to the governance issues resulting 
from these various sources of funding.  A social enterprise may bring together actors as 
different as entrepreneurs, traditional investors, impact investors and philanthropic 
contributors.  Each of them has different expectations: one may ask for a higher rate of 
return, while another may be more focused on controlling the venture or assuring that it 
furthers its social mission.  Thus, the double bottom line, which implies co-equal financial 
and social returns, also leads to a financial structure that presents governance and funding 
challenges.  
This broad overview of social enterprises’ business models reveals two constraints 
flowing from their double bottom line: social enterprises aims at being financially flexible 
while ensuring that their social mission prevails over mere profit-maximization.  This 
double constraint renders traditional tax-exempt organizations hardly practicable for social 
enterprises.  
 The Tax-Exempt Entity: An Appealing but Rigid Framework to Host a 
Social Business 
Under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code, the tax-exempt sector can be 
divided into two categories.  On the one hand there are the section 501(c)(3) entities, which 
are organised and operated exclusively for certain exempt purposes.28  The term “charitable 
organizations” is used to identify them both because “charitable” is the residual exempt 
purpose they can further and because the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that all section 
501(c)(3) organizations must meet “certain common law standards of charity.” 29  The 
charitable world is itself divided between public charities and private foundations 
depending, essentially, on the width of the organization’s financial support.30  Indeed, 
while public charities are broad publicly-supported nonprofits, the funding sources of 
private foundations are more limited.31  On the other hand, there are the “noncharitable 
nonprofits,” which are organized under sections 501(c)(4)-(25).32  These entities “may 
roughly be described as carrying forward the private interests of their members.”33  Even 
though the distinction is not absolutely accurate, it is often stated that the former provide 
“public benefit” while the latter provide “mutual benefit.”34  
                                                        
28 These exempt purposes are charitable, religious, educational, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, 
fostering national or international amateur sports competition, and preventing cruelty to children or 
animals.  See 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2012) 
29 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983).  The legal meaning of charitable purpose is 
further broadly construed: see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d) (2008). 
30 See Internal Revenue Serv., Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status 5, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4220.pdf ("Every organization that qualifies for tax-exempt status 
under section 501(c)(3) of the IRC is further classified as either a public charity or a private 
foundation.  Under section 508(b) of the IRC, every organization is automatically classified as a 
private foundation unless it meets one of the exceptions listed in sections 508(c) or 509(a)."). 
31 See, e.g., JAMES J.  FISHMAN & STEPHEN SHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 722 (4th ed. 2010) 
(Stating that public charities "share the characteristic of ‘publicness’ in that they rely on 
public support or are accountable to a broad constituency."). 
32 Id. at 41. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
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While charitable and non-charitable nonprofits are both tax-exempt, there are a 
number of advantages that only charitable organizations enjoy.35  Most notably, 501(c)(3) 
status provides eligibility to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions. 36   Thus, 
charitable organizations are more likely to benefit from individual and corporate donors, 
as they will be entitled to deduct their donations.37  Further, this status guarantees grant-
making institutions, and particularly foundations,38 that the organization is a permitted 
beneficiary under the Internal Revenue Code.39  Overall, the 501(c)(3) status also operates 
as a brand by identifying the organization’s activity as a proper social mission.  Thus, 
charitable organizations, and particularly public charities, can attract resources that are 
appealing for social enterprises.  Indeed, at least until charitable organizations reach the 
profitability stage, their social bottom line, which usually meets the broad definition of 
charitable activity, could incentivize them to structure the venture as a tax-exempt 
organization to attract charitable contributions and grants.  However, the business model 
previously discussed seems incompatible with the requirements that an entity must meet to 
qualify as a public charity.  
 The Economic Bottom Line: A Financial Return Irreconcilable with the 
Constraints of the Third Sector 
Nonprofit organizations are not automatically tax-exempt.  A nonprofit is required 
to apply for the exemption, and it will be granted only if the entity meets a variety of 
criteria.40  A comprehensive study of these requirements is beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, a brief overview of the tensions between some of them and the double bottom 
line is helpful to understand why a genuine social enterprise cannot qualify as a tax-exempt 
nonprofit. 
To qualify for tax-exempt status pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, a nonprofit must be organized and operated exclusively for exempt 
purposes as set forth in that section, and none of its earnings may inure to any private 
shareholder or individual.41  The Treasury Regulations provide a twofold test to determine 
whether a nonprofit meets these requirements.42 
 On the one hand, the nonprofit must pass a formalistic “organizational test,” which 
scrutinizes the language of its organic documents. 43   Under this test, the articles of 
                                                        
35 For a broad overview of these advantages, see FISHMAN, supra note 32, at 42-43.  See also Internal 
Revenue Serv., supra note 31, at 2 ("An IRS determination of 501(c)(3) status is recognized 
and accepted for other purposes.  For example, state and local officials may grant exemption 
from income, sales or property taxes.  In addition, the U.S. Postal Service offers reduced postal 
rates to certain organizations."). 
36 I.R.C. § 170(a) (2012). 
37 Under §170 of the Internal Revenue Code, deductibility of contributions to a public charity is higher than 
deductibility of contributions to a private foundation.  However, the federal gift and estate tax 
treatment of gift and bequest to public charities and private foundation is the same, pursuant to 
I.R.C. §§ 2055,  2522. 
38 This point is developed infra regarding the difficulties that corporations face to attract foundation grants.  
See infra Part IV.B. 
39 See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 31, at 2.  
40 See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 31, at 5. 
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a) (2008). 
42 Id. 
43 See FISHMAN, supra note 32, at 315. 
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organization must limit the purposes of such an organization44 to one or more exempt 
purposes; and not expressly empower the organization to engage, in a substantial way, in 
activities which in themselves are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.45  
This requirement is easy to meet, as the articles can be as broad as the purposes set forth in 
section 501(c)(3).  For example, it is enough for the articles to state that the organization 
is formed for charitable purposes within the meaning of section 501(c)(3).46  Thus, the 
organizational test, at this stage, does not bar public charities from hosting social 
enterprises.47  
Another part of the organizational test is nonetheless of more difficulty to them. 
Pursuant to Treasury Regulations, the articles must constrain the organization, upon 
dissolution, to distribute its assets to another 501(c)(3) or the Federal or State government 
for public purpose.48  Thus, it is impossible for a 501(c)(3) to distribute its assets to its 
members or shareholders upon dissolution. 
On the other hand, the treasury regulation establishes an operational test that 
essentially paraphrases the statute requirements.49  Of most interest is the concession that 
“An organization will be regarded as operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes 
only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt 
purposes . . . .”50  Thus, a public charity can further nonexempt purposes as long as they 
represent an insubstantial part of its activities. The Treasury Regulation further provides 
that: 
An organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3) although 
it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if the 
operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization's 
exempt purpose or purposes and if the organization is not organized or 
operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or 
business, as defined in section 513.51   
As a result, when a public charity carries on a business-like activity, assessing 
whether the primariy purpose requirement is met first necessitates asking if the business is 
in furtherance of the organization’s exempt purpose.  If it is, then even a substantial 
business activity will not jeopardize the exempt status.  If it is not, a substantial business 
activity will jeopardize the exempt status, while an insubstantial one will only trigger an 
additional tax.  In other terms, an organization “can engage in a trade or business so long 
                                                        
44 THE ORGANIZATION MUST BE A CORPORATION, AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION, A 
TRUST, COMMUNITY CHEST, FUND, OR FOUNDATION.  ORGANIZATIONAL TEST - 




45 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i) (2008). 
46 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(ii) (2008). 
47 Even though Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iii) prohibits the articles from authorizing the nonprofit to 
engage in a manufacturing business otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activities, it is 
more a drafting constraint at the stage of the organizational test than a substantive one. 
48 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (2008). 
49 See FISHMAN, supra note 32, at 317. 
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2008). 
51 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (2008).  
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as it furthers the organization’s tax-exempt purpose and, if it does not, so long as it does 
not constitute the primary purpose of the organization.”52  
This issue is critical for social enterprises.  It stems from their business model that 
they aim at achieving social outcomes through their very business activity.  The core of the 
notion of social entrepreneurship is that “social entrepreneurs use business acumen to do 
well and do good.”53  The Generation Water example54 accurately illustrates this point: the 
business activity contributes to the development of a sustainable economy through the 
employment of young workers to restore landscapes and promote water saving.  
Consequently, a genuine social enterprise typically conducts a business-like activity as its 
primary purpose.  Thus, social enterprises that want to adopt a public charity vehicle must 
ascertain that their business activity adequately furthers an exempt purpose.  
To determine whether the business activity furthers an exempt purpose, the 
Treasury Regulation first refers to section 513 of the Internal Revenue Code that defines 
“unrelated trade or business” for the application of the unrelated business income tax.  
Section 513 defines “unrelated trade or business” as any trade or business the conduct of 
which is not substantially related to the tax exempt purpose, aside from the need of such 
organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived.55  Treasury 
Regulation section 1.513-1 provides more guidance in the definition of unrelated trade or 
business.  Pursuant to the regulation, a business is related to exempt purposes only where 
the conduct of the business activities has a causal relationship to the achievement of exempt 
purposes (other than through the production of income).56  It is then substantially related 
only if the causal relationship is a substantial one, i.e. if the business activity contributes 
importantly to the accomplishment of those exempt purposes.57  Whether a business-like 
activity importantly contributes to an exempt purpose thus requires a fact-intensive inquiry 
and highly depends on the circumstances.58  To this end, the regulation indicates that when 
assessing this “important contribution” criterion, the size and extent of the activities 
involved must be considered in relation to the nature and extent of the exempt function 
which they purport to serve.59  Indeed, the scale of the business activity must not exceed 
what is reasonably necessary for performance of the exempt purpose.60  If the business is 
carried on at a larger scale than what the needs of the exempt function reasonably require, 
then this business is unrelated to the exempt purpose.61  As a consequence, if this activity 
is a primary one in the organization, then the tax-exempt status will be jeopardized.62  
Although this understanding of the regulations “loosely links the exemption qualification 
question with the UBIT relatedness standard,” it underscores the issues that double bottom 
                                                        
52 Cameron Holland, Engaging in a Trade or Business as a 501(c)(3) Organization, http://cameronholland.co 
m/engaging-in-a-trade-or-business-as-a-501c3-organization/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
53 Raed Elaydi, Do Well and Do Good: How Social Entrepreneurship is Changing the World, ROOSEVELT REV.,  
Fall 2012, at 18, 19, available at http://www.roosevelt.edu/~/media/Files/pdfs/RooseveltReview 
/RRFall2012_pdf.ashx 
54 See GENERATION WATER, supra note 21. 
55 I.R.C. § 513(a) (2012). 
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (1983). 
57 Id.  
58 Id. 
59 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3) (1983). 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  
62 Otherwise, the exempt status is not affected but the gross income from this unrelated activity, i.e. that 
portion of the activities in excess of the needs of exempt functions, will be subject to the unrelated 
business income tax.  See 26 U.S.C. § 511 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 513 (2012). 
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line entities face if they adopt a 501(c)(3) vehicle.  Notably, they often conduct their 
business activity at a larger scale than reasonably needed for their exempt purpose as they 
aim at creating economic wealth along with social benefits.63  
Further, this area of tax law is particularly blurry and fact-specific.  As a result, 
even if there is a strong argument that the business activity importantly contributes to the 
exempt purpose, the Internal Revenue Service often applies “an amorphous ‘all the facts 
and circumstances’ smell test that never even mentions the UBIT.”64  Under the so-called 
“commerciality doctrine,”65 the focus is on the nature of the activity, i.e. whether the 
business has a “commercial hue.”66  As a result, although there is no bright line in this area, 
the stronger the business logic is in the conduct of the organization’s activity, the weaker 
the tax-exempt status gets.67  In any case, because double bottom line entities equally, or 
co-primarily, aim at making profit and achieving social outcomes, they are more likely to 
fall outside of courts’ tolerance for business-like activities.68  
Another part of the operational test presents even greater challenges to social 
enterprises’ business model. The Treasury Regulation forbids the inurement of the 
organization’s earnings to insiders, i.e. persons having a personal and private interest in the 
activities of the organization.69  The related private benefit doctrine, which was articulated 
in a landmark U.S. Tax Court opinion,70 expressly states that the prohibition is not limited 
to these insiders.  Thus, the private benefit rule prevents 501(c)(3)s from providing any 
substantial benefit to outsiders, who are labelled “disinterested persons”71 by the court.  As 
a result, the inurement and private benefit doctrines, along with the dissolution constraints, 
effectively prevent section 501(c)(3) organizations from substantially benefiting private 
interests at any time.72  This “non-distribution constraint”73 underscores the fact that tax-
exempts have no owners, and thus their benefits must be reinvested in their public 
endeavors.  This constraint is particularly harmful to social enterprises as it limits their 
access to capital.  Indeed, section 501(c)(3) organizations cannot generate a return to 
venture capitalists, neither during the activity nor at the dissolution of the entity, and their 
                                                        
63 See FISHMAN, supra note 32, at 572. 
64 Id. 
65 See Holland, supra note 53. 
66 Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945). 
67 For a summary of the factors the Courts and the Internal Revenue Service have considered for the 
application of this doctrine, see Holland, supra note 53. 
68 Id. (noting that “the presence of a single non-educational purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the 
exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly educational purposes,” and hence 
because “an important if not the primary pursuit of petitioner's organization is to promote not only 
an ethical but also a profitable business community,” “the exemption is therefore unavailable to 
petitioner.”) 
69 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (2008). 
70 Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989). 
71 Id. at 1069 (“We use ‘disinterested‘ to distinguish persons who are not private shareholders or individuals 
having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization within the meaning of 
section 1.501(a)-1(c), Income Tax Regs.”). 
72 While beyond the scope of this paper, it must be noted that the Internal Revenue Service and the Courts 
view inurement and private benefit doctrines are distinct ones, notably as to the consequences of 
disregarding them.  See, e.g., Am. Campaign Acad. , 92 T.C. at 1068; Canada v. Commissioner, 82 
T.C. 973, 981 (1984); Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 202,215 (1978); Church of 
Ethereal Joy v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 20, 21 (1984); Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 337, 345 n.10 (1980).   
73 The term originated with Henry Hansmann.  See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprises, 89 
YALE L. J. 835 (1980). 
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funding is thus limited to donations, grants and self-generated incomes, along with 
traditional loans.  
As a result, even in cases where the tax-exempt social enterprise is permitted to 
further a business-like activity under the operational test, the non-distribution constraint 
would prevent the entity from generating a financial return to its founders and investors.  
Thus, a genuine social enterprise will not adopt a tax-exempt vehicle since the dual bottom 
line implies not only financial profitability but also financial returns to investors.74  While 
a tax-exempt vehicle could attract substantial charitable funding, it fails to address the 
diversity of interests represented in a social enterprise.  
III THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY MYTH, A BARRIER TO CORPORATE 
SOCIAL ACTIVISM? 
It is commonly taught that a director's duty is to prioritize the creation of 
shareholder wealth over other considerations.  Part A explains that this duty does not 
merely stem from statutory provisions.  Part B then briefly clarifies how directors’ 
fiduciary duties catch the shareholder primacy doctrine.  
 The Overall Absence of Statutory Provisions 
In 1962, Milton Friedman wrote that, in a free economy, “there is one and only 
one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed 
to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.”75  Along with Smith, 
Friedman considers that corporations are ill equipped to address social issues, and thus 
instead of diversifying the interests they further they should specialize in the efficient 
maximization of profit.  This specialization – corporations make profit whereas the 
government addresses social interests – would in turn maximize the overall welfare.76 The 
merits of this theory need not be discussed here.  Of greater relevance is whether the 
economic apprehension of corporations has resulted in a legal framework limiting their 
ability to further social purposes.  
States’ corporate statutory laws are mostly silent on this issue. For instance, section 
102(a)(3) of Delaware General Corporation Law only requires that the purpose of the 
corporation be to engage in “any lawful act or activity.”77  Section 3.01 of the Model 
Business Corporation Act provides that corporations shall have the purpose of “engaging 
in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of 
incorporation.”78  Thus, the broadly defined statutory purposes of corporations do not 
prevent them from engaging incidentally, or even primarily, in social activities that do not 
seek the maximization of profit.  Interestingly enough, the American Law Institute (ALI’s) 
Principles of Corporate Governance depart from state laws: Section 2.01 provides that “a 
corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to 
                                                        
74 Other constraints limit the use of a 501(c)(3) vehicle for social enterprises, such as the interdiction of self-
dealing or the prohibition of political activity.  Some of these can be circumvented notably through 
the adoption of a 501(c)(4) nonprofit.  However, a comprehensive study of these limitations is not 
necessary since this development on tax-exempt nonprofits only aims at underscoring that they 
suffer from an inflexible business model hardly compatible with the financial bottom line of social 
enterprises.  
75 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). 
76 THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 68-69 (1982). 
77 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (West 2013). 
78 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT  § 3.01 (2008). 
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enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”79  ALI’s Principles nonetheless admit 
exceptions to this profit-based conduct when the corporation either takes into account 
ethical considerations reasonably related to the responsible conduct of its business, or 
allocates a reasonable amount of its resources to listed social purposes.80  Thus the ALI’s 
Principles only authorize corporations to depart from their profit maximization purpose 
incidentally.  This is scarcely compatible with the double bottom line that social 
entrepreneurs seek since it only enables corporations to develop a corporate social 
responsibility practice.   
However, although they undeniably are of doctrinal interests, these principles have 
no binding force.  Thus, statutory corporate law, in and of itself, is not a sufficient source 
to require corporations to further exclusively or primarily wealth maximization.  Rather, 
this theory seems to stem from the “legal principles of agency, property rights, 81 and 
contract,82 all of which are intertwined in the corporate form.”83  
 The Fiduciary Duty to Prioritize Shareholders’ Value 
Indeed, the agency relationship between board members and shareholders84 has 
been widely construed as directing the formers (the agents) to maximize the wealth of the 
latters (the principals.) 
The foundation of this shareholder primacy theory is traditionally traced back to 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.85 in which the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that “it is not 
within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a 
corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose 
of benefiting others.” 86   This stems from the premise that “a business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders,” and “the powers of 
the directors are to be employed for that end.”87  Hence the idea of a shareholder primacy 
model of corporate governance, in which directors’ actions must primarily aim at 
increasing shareholders’ profits.88  Even though it is sometimes argued that Dodge is a 
“doctrinal oddity,”89 it is more widely understood as “an accurate statement of the form, if 
not the substance, of the current law that describes the fundamental purpose of the 
                                                        
79 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, § 2.01 (1994). 
80  Id. 
81 See Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate 
Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 635-36 (2009) (“Under [the property] theory, the corporation is 
seen as the property of the shareholders and the corporate managers, as the agents of the 
shareholders, are obliged to act to advance the latter's financial interests."). 
82 See id. at 637 (Stating that under the contractarian theory, "profit maximization is the goal of the 
corporation because this is the expectation, or 'bargained for right,' under which shareholders have 
implicitly contracted with the corporation.”) 
83 John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary 
Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 129 (2010). 
84 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("The existence and exercise of directors' 
power carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its 
shareholders."), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
85 204 Mich. 459 (1919). 
86 Id. at 684. 
87 Id.  
88 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 497, 546 (1992). 
89 Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
163, 166 (2008). 
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corporation.”90  Under this view, any profit reinvested in the social endeavor conflicts with 
shareholders’ interest in increasing the financial return on their equity investment.91 
It is not necessary, for the purpose of this paper, to precisely define the content of 
directors’ fiduciary duties.  Corporations being creatures of states, the fiduciary duties of 
their directors vary depending on the location of their incorporation.  Yet, a broad overview 
of how Delaware has implemented the shareholder primacy model is appropriate since this 
state is legal home for more than 50% of all publicly-traded companies in the United States, 
including 63% of the Fortune 500,92 and its case law is influential nationwide.  The specific 
substance of directors’ fiduciary duties needs not be stated here.  Of more interest is the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s focus on whether directors are entitled to further nonprofit-
maximising considerations.  In this matter, Delaware Courts’ deference to directors’ 
judgement depends on the context of their decision. 
Section 141(a) of Delaware General Corporation Law provides that “the business 
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
supervision of a board of directors.”93  Accordingly, in the day-to-day management of the 
business directors are entitled to the business judgement rule, pursuant to which Courts 
defer to their determination that the action taken was in the best interest of the company. 94  
Thus, the rule is both a substantive standard of review and a procedural burden of proof.  
Under the former, “where the business judgment presumptions are applicable, the board’s 
decision will be upheld unless it cannot be attributed to any rational business purpose.”95  
Under the latter, the rule “places the burden on the party challenging the board’s decision 
to establish facts rebutting the presumption.”96  Hence, in the day-to-day decision-making, 
the business judgement rule grants director great latitude to undertake social actions as 
courts defer to their determination that it furthers the overall interest of the corporation.97  
In some specific circumstances however, courts apply a higher standard of review requiring 
directors to establish a closer relationship between shareholders’ benefit and other 
constituencies’ interests.  
First, when defensive measures are adopted in a takeover context, Delaware Courts 
have scrutinized directors’ decisions under the so-called heightened or reasonableness 
                                                        
90 Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 177, 178 (2008). 
91 See, e.g., Doeringer, supra note 18, at 304. 
92 About Agency, DELAWARE.GOV, http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
93 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2013). 
94 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating that the business judgment rule creates 
"a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company"). 
95 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. 
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)); see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 (Del. Ch. 
2002) ("The judgment of a properly functioning board will not be second-guessed and absent an 
abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts."). 
96 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995). 
97 See, e.g., Steven J. Haymore, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B Corporations and the Delaware 
Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311, 1327-28 (2011) ("In fact, directors 
can connect virtually every business decision to a rationally related benefit to the 
company, absent waste of corporate proceeds."); Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of 
Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 989, 1030 (1993) ("Modern 
law allows directors to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies as long as the impact 
on shareholders is not excessive."). 
114 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.5:100 
 
scrutiny.  Indeed, under Unocal98 and its progeny,99 to benefit from the business judgement 
rule directors must first prove that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger 
to corporate policy and effectiveness existed; and then that the defensive measures are 
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.  On various occasions, courts ruled that directors 
might consider the interests of constituencies distinct from the shareholders when 
addressing a takeover threat, provided nonetheless that there was “some rationally related 
benefit accruing to stockholders”100 or that so doing bore “some reasonable relation to 
general shareholder interest.”101  Therefore, despite a reduced leeway there is still room for 
social considerations under the heightened scrutiny. 
It is in another context, namely the sale of the corporation, that the shareholder 
primacy theory truly applies.  Under Revlon102 and its progeny, when a company is at 
auction103 the directors’ only duty becomes to maximise shareholders’ value.  In such a 
context, Revlon explicitly directed that “concern for non-stockholder interests is 
inappropriate.”104  That is why in 2000 Ben & Jerry’s directors felt they had to accept 
Unilever’s bid, although it would undoubtedly jeopardize the corporation’s double bottom 
line.105  Indeed, they accepted its offer while lesser bidders would have better continued 
Ben & Jerry’s social endeavours.106 
As a result, the duty to prioritize shareholders’ value over non-shareholders’ 
considerations is absolute only in the narrow situations in which Revlon is triggered.  Thus, 
the acquisition setting aside, directors enjoy some leeway to undertake social actions, in 
Delaware107 and elsewhere.108  Further, the corporation entity is traditionally construed as 
                                                        
98 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
99 See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); Moran v. Household 
International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (1985); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
100 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-83 (Del. 1986). 
 
101 Mills Acquisition Co v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1982 (Del. 1989). 
102 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173. 
103 The Court of Chancery recently summarized the triggering circumstances of Revlon: “[U]nder binding 
authority of our Supreme Court as set forth in QVC and its progeny, Revlon duties only apply when 
a corporation undertakes a transaction that results in the sale or change of control . . . A change of 
control 'does not occur for purposes of Revlon where control of the corporation remains, post-
merger, in a large, fluid market.'”  In re Synthes, Inc. S'holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1048-49 (Del. 
Ch. 2012) (quoting In re NYMEX S'holder Litig., No. 3621-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 176, at *5 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009). 
104 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
105 Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a Social 
Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 212 (2010); see also Jill Bamburg, GETTING TO SCALE: 
GROWING YOUR BUSINESS WITHOUT SELLING OUT 57 (2006) ("Virtually every mission-driven 
entrepreneur knows the sad ending to the tale of Ben & Jerry's: the forced sale of one of the 
country's premier socially responsible businesses to a giant multinational clearly focused on 
the financial bottom line."). 
106 Katherine R. Lofft et al., Are Hybrids Really More Efficient?, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.  21, 2012, at 1. 
107 See, e.g., Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business 
Judgment Rule Protects a Board's Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 623, 668 (2007) ("However, the existing framework of corporate governance law allows for 
social impact considerations.  Under the laws of corporate governance, specifically the duty of care 
as protected by the business judgment rule, board decisions are protected."). 
108 See, e.g., A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 97 A.2d 186, 190 (N.J. 1953) (“Corporate contributions to 
Princeton and institutions rendering the like public service are, if held within reasonable 
limitations, a matter of direct benefit to the giving corporations, and this without regard to the 
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a “contract-based form of business organization” in which the shareholder-primacy model 
is merely a default rule. 109  Consequently, shareholders could contract around directors’ 
duty to maximize profits through adequate charter provisions.  However, they have shown 
little tendency to do so,110 certainly due to practical and tax barriers that add to the legal 
framework uncertainties. 
IV BEING TRAPPED BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: THE CHALLENGE OF 
CAPITALIZING SOCIAL ENTERPRISES 
Part A delineates the challenges that social enterprises encounter to raise funding 
on the market place.  Part B subsequently describes the tax provisions that prevent for-
profit social enterprises from receiving charitable contributions and grants.  Part C finally 
underscores the issues they confront to attract the one foundation investment that is 
available to them, namely the program-related investment.  
 Raising Capital from the For-Profit Sector: Identifying the Practical 
Barriers  
In the traditional binary legal framework, it is difficult for double bottom line for-
profits to efficiently brand their social commitment.  While each social enterprise can 
individually signal itself as such, there is a lack of, and hence a need for, a unified and 
identifiable marketable brand.111  Indeed, branding and positioning social enterprises on 
the market place has long been identified as the key to raising capital and building customer 
loyalty. 112   Social enterprises are frequently confused with corporate philanthropy or 
corporate social responsibility models, in which social endeavors are merely incidental to 
the financial bottom line, and often serve marketing purposes as well.113  Thus, by telling 
the difference between “a good company and just good marketing,”114 a recognizable brand 
could attract consumers and investors equally interested in social and financial returns.  
Screening double bottom line for-profits is the key to attracting Sustainable and 
Responsible Investments.  Sustainable and Responsible Investing (SRI)115 considers both 
the investor's financial needs and an investment’s impact on society so as to build wealth 
in underserved communities or a more sustainable world while earning competitive 
                                                        
extent or sweep of the donors' business.  The benefits derived from such contributions are nation-
wide and promote the welfare of everyone anywhere in the land.”) 
109 See Macey, supra note 92, at 179. 
110 Id. 
111 See, e.g., Michael D. Gottesman, From Cobblestones to Pavement: the Legal Road Forward for the 
Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 345, 351 (2007). 
112 See, e.g., Jason Mogus, It's All About Them: Branding and Positioning your Social Enterprise to Build 




113 See Kelley, supra note 9, at 362. 
114 Frequently Asked Questions, B CORPS FOR NON-PROFITS, http://www.bcorpsfornonprofits.com/faq (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
115 SRI is also referred to as mission investing, responsible investing, double or triple bottom line investing, 
ethical investing, sustainable investing, or green investing.  See, e.g., Sustainable and Socially 
Responsible Investing, BLUE SUMMIT WEALTH MANAGEMENT, 
http://www.bluesummitwealth.com/investing/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
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returns.116  SRI mutual funds have significantly grown over 20 years117 and they now use a 
wide spectrum of investment products, “from stocks and bonds, to savings, checking and 
other banking accounts, to venture capital.”118  As a result, although social entrepreneurs 
are confident in the development of this source of funding, they emphasize the need for a 
distinctive brand for the fourth sector to be adequately screened by SRI funds.119  Attracting 
alternative capital is further desirable as social enterprises face practical difficulties to 
attract funds commonly available to for-profits at their start-up and expansion stages.  
Traditional investors have returns on investment objectives to meet regardless of whether 
the business achieves – incidentally or primarily – social welfare missions;120 whereas 
social enterprises need what is sometimes called “patient capital,” which aims at “slow but 
steady growth.”121  Hence, their difficulties to commit to market-rate returns undermines 
their access to traditional investors.  
A second practical barrier, once the capital is raised, pertains to the “challenge of 
locking assets into the social enterprise stream.”122  Social entrepreneurs aim at ensuring 
that the capital they raised remains dedicated to the social endeavours.  However, the 
pressure of the market could incentivize managers to focus more on financial returns than 
on the social accomplishments in the actual running of the business.  Further, the Ben & 
Jerry case is an accurate example of the threat that a change in ownership poses to the 
social bottom line.  No law prevents the new controlling entity from allocating the 
corporation’s capital primarily or exclusively to profit maximization.123  Thus, as a matter 
of credibility as well as to incentivise SRI investments, social entrepreneurship would 
benefit from the development of asset lock mechanisms. 
 Benefitting from Charitable Contributions and Grants: The Tax Barriers 
Federal tax law also operates as a barrier to social accomplishments by for-profits 
as it denies them access to financial resources available to tax-exempt nonprofits.  First, 
individual and corporate donations and gifts are only deductible when made to 501(c)(3) 
nonprofits.124  As a result, for-profits do not receive charitable contributions, although their 
social bottom line triggers some sympathy in the general public.  Further, for-profits hardly 
obtain funding from private foundations.  
Broadly defined, a foundation is “a fund of private wealth established for charitable 
purposes, often in perpetuity.” 125   Foundations are usually construed as grant-making 
institutions, as opposed to public charities that actually operate a charitable program.126  In 
                                                        
116 SRI Basics, US SIF, http://www.ussif.org/sribasics (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
117 Id. (“As of 2012, there were 333 mutual fund products in the US that consider environmental, social, or 
corporate governance (ESG) criteria, with assets of $640.5 billion. By contrast, there were just 55 
SRI funds in 1995 with $12 billion in assets.”) 
118 Performance and SRI Investments, US SIF, http://ussif.org/resources/performance.cfm (last visited Nov. 
8, 2013). 
119 See Kelley, supra note 9, at 359. 
120 Victor Fleischer, Urban Entrepreneurship and the Promise of For-Profit Philanthropy, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 93, 94 (2007) ("The greater challenge facing urban entrepreneurs is convincing investors that they 
will receive a sufficient return on their investment."). 
121  See Kelley, supra note 9, at 354. 
122 Id. at 359. 
123 See, e.g.. Allen R. Bromberger, Social Enterprise: A Lawyer's Perspective, http://www.perlmanandperlma 
n.com/publications/articles/2008/socialenterprise.pdf  (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (underscoring that 
“[a] change in ownership or control – or a drop in earnings – can bring everything down.”). 
124 See supra Part II.B. 
125 See FISHMAN, supra note 32, at 703. 
126 Id. 
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many ways, due to Congressional defiance over foundations,127 their federal tax treatment 
is less favorable than the federal tax treatment of public charities.  Indeed, a variety of 
excise taxes and penalties limits their ability to engage in activities such as self-dealing,128 
excess ownership in a business enterprize,129 jeopardy investments130 or expenditures for 
non-charitable purposes.131  
The minimum distribution requirement is here of particular interest.  Pursuant to 
section 4942 of the Internal Revenue Code, private foundations must make a certain 
amount of qualifying distributions each year, and failure to do so triggers a burdensome 
excise tax.  These qualifying distributions are essentially charitable contributions, as 
defined in section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code; hence contribution to for-
profit social enterprises would not be included in the foundation-qualified distributions.  
Further, section 4945 lists a number of expenditures that are subject to heavy tax penalties 
due to their inconsistency with the foundation public interest purpose.  Prohibited 
expenditures notably include grants to any organization that is not a public charity or an 
operating private foundation unless the private foundation exercises expenditures 
responsibility to ensure that the grant is used only for charitable purposes.132  Therefore, 
for-profits are virtually excluded from foundations’ grant-making programs.  
Hence foundations, under the federal tax framework, are more likely to contribute 
to for-profits through traditional investment from their endowment funds.  Their leeway is 
however limited by a burdensome tax on investments that jeopardize their exempt 
purpose.133  According to the treasury regulation, the jeopardy rule is triggered when the 
“foundation managers . . . have failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence, 
under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the investment, in providing for 
the long- and short-term financial needs of the foundation to carry out its exempt 
purposes.”134  The regulation further indicates how the standard of care and prudence must 
be construed135  and how to determine whether the investment of a particular amount 
jeopardizes the carrying out of the exempt purposes.136  As a result, risk-averse foundations 
will not invest in social enterprises at their early or expansion stages, as the risk of such 
investment might trigger the jeopardy rule.  They would rather invest in traditional widely 
                                                        
127 Id. 
128 I.R.C. § 4941 (2012). 
129 I.R.C. § 4943 (2012). 
130 I.R.C. § 4944 (2012). 
131 I.R.C. § 4945 (2012). 
132 I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4) (2012). 
133 I.R.C. § 4944 (2012).  This tax is equal to 10 percent of the amount so invested for each year in the 
taxable period, and a penalty is also imposed on any foundation manager that knowingly 
participated in the jeopardy investment.  Additional taxes can be triggered as well if the foundation 
does not take remedial measures.  Id. 
134 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (1973). 
135 Id.  (“In the exercise of the requisite standard of care and prudence the foundation managers may take into 
account the expected return (including both income and appreciation of capital), the risks of rising 
and falling price levels, and the need for diversification within the investment portfolio (for 
example, with respect to type of security, type of industry, maturity of company, degree of risk and 
potential for return).”). 
136 Id.  (“The determination whether the investment of a particular amount jeopardizes the carrying out of the 
exempt purposes of a foundation shall be made on an investment by investment basis, in each case 
taking into account the foundation's portfolio as a whole.  No category of investments shall be 
treated as a per se violation of section 4944.”). 
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held corporations, which although not particularly committed to public welfare offer a 
secure return on investment.  
The treasury regulation clearly illustrates this point in the example (1), which 
provides:  
A is a foundation manager of B, a private foundation with assets of 
$100,000. A approves the following three investments by B after taking 
into account with respect to each of them B's portfolio as a whole: (1) An 
investment of $5,000 in the common stock of corporation X; (2) an 
investment of $10,000 in the common stock of corporation Y; and (3) an 
investment of $8,000 in the common stock of corporation Z. Corporation 
X has been in business a considerable time, its record of earnings is good 
and there is no reason to anticipate a diminution of its earnings. 
Corporation Y has a promising product, has had earnings in some years 
and substantial losses in others, has never paid a dividend, and is widely 
reported in investment advisory services as seriously undercapitalized. 
Corporation Z has been in business a short period of time and 
manufactures a product that is new, is not sold by others, and must 
compete with a well-established alternative product that serves the same 
purpose. Z's stock is classified as a high-risk investment by most 
investment advisory services with the possibility of substantial long-term 
appreciation but with little prospect of a current return. A has studied the 
records of the three corporations and knows the foregoing facts. In each 
case the price per share of common stock purchased by B is favorable to 
B. Under the standards of paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section, the 
investment of $10,000 in the common stock of Y and the investment of 
$8,000 in the common stock of Z may be classified as jeopardizing 
investments, while the investment of $5,000 in the common stock of X 
will not be so classified. B would then be liable for an initial tax of $500 
(i.e., 5 percent of $10,000) for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable 
period for the investment in Y, and an initial tax of $400 (i.e., 5 percent of 
$8,000) for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period for the 
investment in Z. Further, since A had actual knowledge that the 
investments in the common stock of Y and Z were jeopardizing 
investments, A would then be liable for the same amount of initial taxes 
as B.137   
In this example, Z’s case is particularly relevant as many social enterprises at their 
early stage offer promising but risky investments.  Even though Example (2)138 provides 
some guidance for such investments to be ruled out of the jeopardy rule, the guarantees139 
it requires to this end are often difficult to meet for start-ups.  The federal tax rules hence 
“support a bizarre paradox for private foundations: a foundation can give its money away 
to an organization supporting the foundation’s mission, but if it makes a risky but 
‘promising’ investment in support of its mission, the foundation faces the threat of penalty 
                                                        
137 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(c) (1973). 
138 Id. 
139 Id., indicating that Z’s management must have demonstrated capacity for getting new businesses started 
successfully and Z must have received substantial orders for its new product.  
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taxes.”140  This is because the jeopardy rule is generally indifferent to the purpose of the 
entities in which the foundation invests.  Thus, only social enterprises that have reached, if 
not profitability, at least a high level of certainty that they will be profitable, can access 
funding from foundation.  
 Attracting Foundation Dollars: The Program-Related Investment 
Experiment 
The jeopardy rule contains an interesting exception for program-related 
investments (PRIs),141 which are somewhere in-between foundation grants and traditional 
investments.  The regulation provides three criteria for an investment to qualify as a PRI.142  
The primary purpose of the investment must be to accomplish a charitable purpose,143 the 
production of income or the appreciation of property must not be a significant purpose, 144 
and the investment cannot further any political or lobbying purpose at all.145 
The regulation then provides that the investment is made primarily to accomplish 
a charitable purpose if it significantly furthers the accomplishment of the private 
foundation's exempt activities and it would not have been made but for such relationship 
between the investment and the accomplishment of the foundation's exempt activities.146  
In addition, it is specified that whether the organization is a 501(c)(3) entity is irrelevant; 
thus a for-profit social enterprise carrying out a charitable purpose could be the recipient 
of a PRI.147  Besides, the regulation indicates that although “whether investors solely 
engaged in the investment for profit would be likely to make the investment on the same 
terms as the private foundation”148 is relevant to determine if a significant purpose of the 
investment is the production of income or the appreciation of property, a substantial return 
on investment shall not be conclusive evidence of such significant purpose absent other 
factors.149  As a result, private foundations can escape the jeopardy rule through risky 
program-related investments in the charitable bottom line of social enterprises.  Indeed, the 
regulation examples (1) to (6) 150  describe some of the various means granted private 
foundations under the PRI exception to invest in business entities, from making a loan to 
purchasing stock.  
An investment only needs to comply with the above-mentioned requirement to 
qualify under the PRI exception.  Then, once it has been determined that an investment is 
“program-related,” it shall not cease to qualify as such as long as changes in the form or 
terms of the investment are made primarily for exempt purposes and not for any significant 
purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property.151  Notably, 
changes made to protect the foundation’s investment do not ordinarily affect the PRI 
                                                        
140 Cass Brewer, Repeal IR § 4944 to Encourage Investment in Social Enterprise, SOCENT LAW (Feb. 25, 
2013), http://socentlaw.com/2013/02/repeal-irc-%C2%A7-4944-to-encourage-investment-in-social-
enterprise/. 
141 I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2012). 
142 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1) (1972). 
143 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(i) (1972). 
144 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(ii) (1972). 
145 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(iii) (1972). 
146 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i) (1972). 
147 Id. 
148 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(iii) (1972). 
149 Id. 
150 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) (1972). 
151 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(3)(i) (1972). 
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qualification.152  However, despite the illusive simplicity of this test, private foundations 
tend to seek a preliminary determination from an Internal Revenue Service private letter 
ruling that a given investment qualifies as a PRI.153  Indeed, an investment that does not 
qualify as such would trigger the heavy tax of the jeopardy rule, and because previous 
private letter rulings have no precedential value, risk-averse foundations usually seek a 
discrete Service’s approval, although it is not required, before initiating a program-related 
investment.154   
The use of PRIs further triggers the foundation’s duty to exercise expenditures’ 
responsibility with respect to the investment155 in order for it not to be considered as taxable 
expenditure.  The expenditures’ responsibility implies that the foundation must exert all 
reasonable efforts and establish adequate procedures to see that the grant is spent solely for 
the purpose for which it was made, to obtain full and complete reports from the grantee on 
how the funds are spent, and to make full and detailed reports with respect to such 
expenditures to the Secretary.156  The regulations first provide that “a private foundation is 
not an insurer of the activity of the organization to which it makes a grant”157 and will thus 
be considered as exercising “expenditure responsibility” under section 4945(h) as long as 
it exerts all reasonable efforts and establishes adequate procedures to comply with its 
requirements.  However, the regulation then goes on with a number of requirements and 
specifies various duties that apply to foundations with regard to the making of PRIs.158  
They can be clearly outlined in 3 steps:  
The first step is the preinvestment inquiry into the organization that will 
potentially receive the PRI.  If after following the regulation guidelines the 
foundation believes the reasonableness standard for the inquiry has been 
met, the foundation must establish and follow a procedure with the 
recipient organization to ensure that the PRI is used for the proper 
purposes.  Finally, the foundation must submit complete and accurate 
reports to the IRS about the status of the PRI in accordance with the 
Regulations.159  
The making of a PRI thus represents a heavy administrative burden for private 
foundations.  They have to design a two-tier reporting system, between the recipient 
organization and the foundation, and between the foundation and the Internal Revenue 
Service.  Besides, as was said above, foundations usually seek a private letter ruling before 
making a PRI.  Thus, PRIs generate significant transactional, legal, administrative and 
                                                        
152 Id. 
153 James P. Joseph & Andras Kosaras, New Strategies for Leveraging Foundation Assets, TAX'N OF 
EXEMPTS, July/Aug. 2008, at 24 (emphasizing that “If an investment meets the requirements, it can 
qualify as a PRI.  IRS approval is not required but foundations considering more complex PRIs 
may find it prudent—despite the time and costs involved—to seek approval from the IRS, given the 
lack of precedential guidance on PRIs.”). 
154 Id. at 24, n.16 (underscoring that “Much of the ‘law‘ on PRIs comes from private letter rulings that offer 
some insights into how the Service may treat a particular investment.  However, letter rulings can 
be relied on only by the taxpayer requesting the ruling and have no precedential authority.”) 
155 I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4) (2012). 
156 I.R.C. § 4945(h) (2012). 
157 Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(1) (1973). 
158 Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(4) (1973). 
159 Christopher C. Archer, Private Benefit for the Public Good: Promoting Foundation Investment in the 
“Fourth Sector” to Provide More Efficient and Effective Social Missions, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 159, 
168 (2011). 
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monitoring costs, and therefore are not widely used,160 with the result that most for-profit 
social enterprises hardly benefit from private foundation funding. 
V NEW DESIGNS FOR OLD TOOLS: WHY THE EARLY LEGAL AND 
STRUCTURAL INNOVATIONS WERE NOT ENOUGH 
This part first develops the early adaptation of the legal framework in an attempt 
to account for stakeholder interests. It then goes on with a description of tandem entities, 
which amount to a practical combination of the tax-exempt and the for-profit worlds. 
 Constituency Statutes: an Inconclusive Effort to Protect Stakeholder 
Interests 
In the flourishing takeover context of the 1980s,161 and with the development of 
the Unocal and Revlon doctrines in the nationally influential Delaware case law, public 
corporations started lobbying for statutory authorisation to consider stakeholder 
interests.162  In the wake of a 1983 Pennsylvania Statute, a number of states adopted statutes 
elucidating the application of the business judgement rule when stakeholder considerations 
conflicted with shareholder interests.  These statutes are usually referred to as “corporate 
constituency statutes,” “nonshareholder constituency statutes,” or “stakeholder statutes,” 
and a majority of the states have adopted them as of today.163  These statutes all have in 
common that the consideration of stakeholder interests is permissible but not mandatory,164 
although an earlier version of the Connecticut statute provided for the compulsory 
consideration of various stakeholder interests.165  The Connecticut unique provision was 
repealed, and the new version now provides that directors may consider, in determining 
what they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation, the interests of 
the corporation's employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, as well as community and 
societal considerations.166 
The Pennsylvania Statute is another great example of this permissive aspect.  It 
provides:  
[I]n discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of 
directors, committees of the board and individual directors of a domestic 
corporation may, in assessing the best interests of the corporation, consider 
the effects of any action upon employees, upon suppliers and customers of 
the corporation and upon communities in which offices or other 
establishments of the corporation are located, and all other pertinent 
factors. The consideration of those factors shall not constitute a violation 
of section 512 (relating to standard of care and justifiable reliance).167  
As a result, whether nonshareholder interests ought to be considered and to what 
extent remains in directors’ discretion.  Although it gives them enough flexibility to engage 
in corporate social responsibility actions, and it is useful to this end, it fails to answer the 
                                                        
160 See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 113, at 350; Heather Sertial, Hybrid Entities: Distributing Profits with a 
Purpose, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 267 (2012). 
161 Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible 
Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 780-81 (2009). 
162 Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and the New Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 
U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 636 (2001). 
163 Bisconti, supra note 163, at 768.  
164 Branson, supra note 164, at 636. 
165 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (1994) (repealed 1997). 
166 CONN. GENN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (1997). 
167 15 PA. CONS.  STAT. ANN. § 516 (2013) 
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branding, capitalizing and lock asset concerns previously identified.  Indeed, these statutes 
are better construed as tools protecting directors when they consider stakeholder interests: 
they merely allow such considerations, in contexts that vary greatly from state to state 
depending on the scope of each statute.  Accordingly, these provisions do not vest any 
additional rights in shareholders or stakeholders, and their impact has been somewhat 
innocuous in the case law. 168   Most notably, the New York constituency provision 
expressly provides that it does not create any additional duties for directors.169  Indeed, 
constituency statutes neither require directors to prioritize stakeholder interests over those 
of shareholders, nor provide for enforcement or standing devices to compel directors to 
consider such interests.170  Consequently, they are insufficient to preserve the social bottom 
line of the fourth sector: a compulsory requirement that directors consider stakeholder 
interests must be sought elsewhere. 
 Tandem Entities, An Attempt to Combine the Two Worlds 
Social entrepreneurs have long tried to combine the flexibility of for-profits with 
the funding opportunities of tax-exempt nonprofits.  Indeed, some entrepreneurs – or more 
accurately their lawyers – have questioned the soundness of having to choose between 
these two worlds.171  Instead, they argue, social entrepreneurs could form both a charitable 
nonprofit and a for-profit: the former would host the social bottom line while the latter 
would carry out the business. 172   These dual entities, often referred to as “tandem 
structures”173 or “cross-sector partnerships,”174 would allow the social business to enjoy the 
branding feature and charitable contributions and grants available to the 501(c)(3)s while 
conducting the business in a flexible entity.  
Two main models of tandems have been identified:  the “nonprofit parent model,” 
in which the for-profit is owned and managed by the nonprofit;175 and the “social business 
mutual benefit model,” in which the for-profit manages the tax-exempt.176  However, both 
of these structures are cumbersome and require comprehensive legal and tax expertise, as 
well as extensive administrative monitoring, to ensure that the tax-exempt status is not 
jeopardized.177  Further, it must be noted at the outset that the situation here contemplated 
is different from a mere joint venture between a tax-exempt and a for-profit, in which the 
tax-exempt usually pre-exists the joint venture and serves a broader charitable purpose.  In 
these ordinary joint ventures, the very concern of the Internal Revenue Service and of 
courts is that the business shall not become the primary activity of the nonprofit.178   
                                                        
168 See Bisconti, supra note 163, at 790 (“Courts seem to be interpreting constituency statutes to essentially 
add nothing to the existing law.”). 
169 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2013). 
170 See Tyler, supra note 84, at 135. 
171 Ingrid Mittermaier et al., Operating In Two Worlds: Tandem Structures in Social Enterprise, 26 No. 1 
PRAC. TAX LAW. 5, 6 (2011).   
172 Id. 
173 See, e.g., id.  
174 See, e.g., Ashley Schoenjahn, New Faces of Corporate Responsibility: Will New Entity Forms Allow 
Businesses to Do Good ?, 37 J. CORP. L. 453, 459 (2012). 
175 Gautam Jagannath, Using Nonprofits to Serve Charitable Goals of Social Businesses in the United States: 
Circumventing the Lack of Recognition of the Social Business Model in the Federal Tax Code, 32 
PACE L. REV. 239, 256 (2012). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 257. 
178 Id. at 253. 
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In the case of a tandem social enterprise, there is a strong relation between the 
business and the charitable purpose.  The business is not merely ancillary to the charitable 
mission, as a pharmacy would be to a hospital.  Further, founders and investors aim at 
retaining control over the venture as well as at getting some financial return while 
achieving social goals.179  Although these two aspects are profoundly intertwined in a 
social enterprise, a tandem structure requires maintaining distinct entities. 180   From a 
governance standpoint, the two entities must conduct their affairs separately, hold distinct 
board meetings, and maintain legal walls between each other to protect their respective 
liabilities.181  In addition, it is necessary to avoid a total overlap on boards’ composition of 
the two entities.182  It is required that the tax-exempt be turned primarily on charitable 
purposes, therefore disinterested directors are arguably needed to approve the conflicting 
interests transactions between the two entities.183  
In a significant private letter ruling,184 the Internal Revenue Service required that 
the tax-exempt parent demonstrate that the subsidiary had a substantial business purpose 
and a separate corporate existence from its parent, and gave some guidelines to this end.  
As a result, the IRS and the courts have particularly scrutinized tax-exempts that provide a 
market for a corporate business controlled by their officers.185  The Service notably requires 
that the for-profit subsidiary have an independent board from the tax-exempt parent and 
that the key officers of both companies be different.186  These constraints stem from the 
private benefit and inurement doctrines,187 which prohibit the tax-exempt entity from being 
dedicated to benefiting the for-profit and its investors.  Tandem entities therefore do not 
offer social entrepreneurs a governance structure flexible enough to accommodate their 
peculiar needs.  The burden of creating two organizations, and of losing control over one 
of them or otherwise risking substantial tax liability, usually greatly exceeds the advantages 
that the combination of the two entities represents.188  The tandem structure further fails to 
address the branding problem that social enterprises face: the two types of investments – 
traditional capital on the one hand, and charitable contributions and grants on the other 
hand – are kept into separate entities that “present different faces to different sectors of 
society.”189  Thus, the two entities loosely appear as an innovative social enterprise as a 
whole and are hardly marketable as such. 
Eventually, the for-profit enterprise has an existence of its own, and this can lead 
to difficulties when it is intended to subsidize the tax-exempt nonprofit entity.  First, a 
donation exceeding ten percent of the corporation’s taxable income is taxed at the corporate 
income tax rate.190  Thus, independent directors are less likely to donate amounts that 
would not be deductible and that, further, might engage their fiduciary duties for waste of 
corporate assets.  The Delaware General Corporation Law expressly authorizes directors 
                                                        
179 See, e.g., Schoejahn, supra note 176. 
180 See Mittermaier et al., supra note 173. 
181 See id. at 8–10. 
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183 See id. at 8. 
184 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9542045 (July 28, 1995). 
185 See, e.g., Church by Mail, Inc. v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1985); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
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to engage in charitable donations.191  Yet, even though there is no formal requirement that 
the donation be limited in size, courts have only upheld “reasonable” donations.192  Further 
the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that in examining the merits of a claim alleging 
corporate waste, “the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to charitable gifts 
by corporations furnish a helpful guide” to assess the reasonableness of the donation.193  
As a result, “it appears that in most situations, for-profit public corporations donating more 
than 10% of their profits to a nonprofit would be opening up themselves to liability from a 
derivative suit, essentially foreclosing this scheme as a viable option for social 
enterprises.”194  
Although only some of the constraints weighing on tandem entities are outlined in 
this part, they underscore that this structure is contrary to the convergence of business and 
charitable missions that social entrepreneurship embodies.  This is so notably because the 
extensive non-distribution constraint and the related private benefit doctrine limit the 
possibility for a social entrepreneur to be the leader of both the business entity and its 
charitable counterpart.  Further, the uncertainty is great in this area as the Internal Revenue 
Service proceeds with a case-by-case analysis instead of establishing a bright line rule, 
usually basing its decision loosely on “all the facts and circumstances.” 195   Hence, 
circumventing these constraints demands expertise and formalism that are scarcely 
consistent with the business-like flexibility that social entrepreneurs seek to introduce in 
the charitable world. 
VI COMBINING THE TWO SECTORS IN HYBRID VEHICLES 
The previous parts have outlined why the tension between for-profits and 
nonprofits to host social enterprises has turned in favor of the for-profits.  Central in this 
conflict was the flexibility that social entrepreneurs need to conduct their business.  
However, some issues remain at least partially unaddressed by for-profit vehicles, namely 
the branding, funding and governance challenges.  Various legislators thus attempted to 
answer the expectations of responsible entrepreneurs who, especially in the wake of the 
2008 financial crisis, were seeking to “re-buff the notion of ‘corporate greed’ by 
diversifying their revenue streams and/or balancing their profitmaking with socially 
responsible motives.” 196   Accordingly, a number of States enacted legislation that 
incentivized for-profits to consider social interests, without the heavy constraints of the 
tax-exempt sector, through hybrid vehicles. Two main vehicles have been created thus far: 
the Benefit Corporation (Part A), and the L3C (Part B). 
 The Benefit Corporation, An Initiative Toward Responsible Businesses 
1. The General Public Benefit: A Purpose Broadly Construed 
At the outset of this subpart, the Benefit Corporation must be distinguished from 
the Certified B Corporation – also called B Corp.  While the former is a legal form, the 
latter is a label granted by B Lab, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit devoted to serving “a global 
movement of entrepreneurs using the power of business to solve social and environmental 
                                                        
191 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2013). 
192 E.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
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196 See Lofft et al., supra note 108. 
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problems.”197  The B Corp label guarantees that the certified entity meets a high standard 
of overall social and environmental performance, along with transparency and 
accountability constraints.198  Once they are labelled as B Corps, these entities gain access 
to a portfolio of services and support from B Lab.199  Thus, Benefit Corporations are not 
necessarily certified as B Corp, and entities need not be organized as Benefit Corporations 
to get certified.  Consequently, whereas B Lab’s initiative provides a solution to the 
branding issue and an easier access to funding, the certification does not in and of itself 
vest any rights or standing in shareholders or stakeholders whose social expectations are 
deceived.  
Maryland was the first state to pass a Benefit Corporation Statute in April 2010.200  
Since then, eleven other states have enacted similar statutes, and fifteen more have 
introduced such legislation.201  Because Maryland’s initiative inspired its sister states, its 
statute is particularly relevant to understand how legislators tried to deal with the social 
enterprise innovation and why they fell short of adequately addressing its challenges.  
Maryland’s Benefit Corporation statute, as well as its counterparts, broadly aims 
at ensuring that Benefit Corporations are socially valuable through three means.  
First, it requires that the Benefit Corporation further “the purpose of creating a 
general public benefit”202 and specifies this general purpose in its charter,203 possibly along 
with one or more specific benefits.204  However, the notion of “general public benefit” is 
defined loosely as “a material, positive impact on society and the environment, as measured 
by a third-party standard, through activities that promote a combination of specific public 
benefits.”205  These specific benefits are then largely construed206 and could be as broad as 
“providing individuals or communities with beneficial products or services” or “increasing 
the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose.”  As a result, a food company 
that would engage in a significant donation program to charities along with providing food 
packages to the poor could qualify as a Benefit Corporation under this first criterion 
although its primary activity would be focused on profit maximization.  Hence, while the 
Benefit Corporation can be an appropriate vehicle for a social enterprise, its wide definition 
is better construed as aimed to host all kinds of responsible businesses.  Indeed, the Benefit 
Corporation allows the creation of double bottom line enterprises but does not require it: 
while a general public benefit purpose must exist, it does not have to be equal to the 
profitmaking purpose. 207   Therefore, a Benefit Corporation can be turned primarily, 
although not exclusively, to profit maximization.  Further, a general public purpose, such 
as donating to charities, is distinct from a social mission accomplished through a business 
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activity.  While a social mission would undoubtedly be a general public purpose, the latter 
is a broader notion than the former.  In other terms, the Benefit Corporation fails to 
“distinguish between a business that chooses to be generally responsible and a business 
that binds itself to a specific social mission.”208  The second and third means then aim at 
ensuring that the Benefit Corporation is actually meeting the public benefit requirement.  
2. Enforcing the Public Purpose, An Uncertain Balance Between 
Adverse Considerations 
As a second means to ensure the beneficial externalities of the corporation, the 
statute creates an affirmative duty for directors to consider stakeholder interests in their 
decision-making.  Community, societal and environmental considerations are expressly 
included in this constraint.209  Thus, the statute expands the traditional fiduciary duties to 
command that directors in their decision-making, in any context,210 consider non-financial 
interests.211  Directors are hence shielded from liability when they further such interests212 
even though their decisions are contrary to mere profit maximization objectives.  
Conversely, directors’ failure to comply with these extended fiduciary duties could trigger 
their liability.  The main question is thus: who is to enforce these provisions?  The statute 
does not go so far as to create a third party right of action.  To the contrary, it expressly 
denies it.213  Hence, only shareholders and directors have a right of action, either for 
“violation of or failure to pursue or create general or specific public benefit”; or for 
violation of the director’s extended standard of conduct. 214   
However, courts have yet to decide to what extent directors can privilege general 
or specific public benefits over profitmaking.  Indeed, the statute indicates that directors 
must consider such benefits in determining what they “reasonably believe[] to be in the 
best interests of the benefit corporation.”215  Thus, the board’s main duty remains to act in 
the overall best interest of the corporation; hence the question of whether their liability is 
triggered by a decision that, despite furthering a general or public benefit, greatly 
undermines the profitability of the corporation.  However, whatever the answer is, directors 
are statutorily immune from liability when they reasonably perform these extended 
duties.216  As this “reasonable performance” standard also remains to be interpreted by the 
courts, the threshold of public benefit or shareholder profit underperformance that would 
trigger directors’ liability is unclear.  Nonetheless, a total leeway for directors to sacrifice 
benefits to social endeavors would deter traditional investors from capitalizing a Benefit 
Corporation.   
Therefore, whether the courts will construe the Benefit Corporation as a device for 
shielding directors from liability or as a tool for allowing shareholders to enforce public 
benefit purposes is yet to be determined.  The latter case still supposes that at least some 
shareholders will be socially driven enough to sue for enforcement of the benefit purpose, 
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as the intended beneficiaries of the Benefit Corporation will not have any right of action.217  
Hence a concern that “[w]hile helpful in encouraging socially-conscious business decisions 
by protecting directors, the statute provides little protection for the mission itself.  The 
broad, unchecked discretion vested in management can result in over-reaching and 
opportunism at the expense of the social benefit.”218 
However, the Benefit Corporation’s actions are not entirely unchecked.  The third 
way that the Maryland statute ensures that some public benefits are achieved is a 
transparency check on the board’s decisions.  Indeed, the corporation must deliver to each 
stockholder an annual benefit report descripting its public benefit achievements and 
assessing its overall corporate social and environmental performance against a third-party 
standard.219  Further, the report must be made available on the corporation’s website or, if 
it does not have a website, the report must be provided to any person that requests it without 
charge.220  However, while the independence of the third party and the transparency of its 
standard are statutorily guaranteed,221 the assessment of the corporation’s performance is 
made by the board itself.222  Thus, this reporting mechanism might not be sufficient to 
ensure that Benefit Corporations act in compliance with their alleged public benefit 
purpose.  
On its face, the concept of the Benefit Corporation addresses the social enterprise’s 
branding challenge through a legal form that is inherently tilted toward public benefit and 
a reporting system that publicly assesses the accomplishment of such benefit.  
Consequently, the branded enterprise should attract more diverse sources of capital, 
notably responsible investments.223  However, because the statute does not strike a decisive 
balance between the conflicting interests at stake, whether this scheme will actually work 
in practice now depends notably on the courts’ answer to the enforceability issue.224  
 The L3C, a Vehicle Specially Tailored for Social Enterprises 
1. An Attempt to Attract Foundation Dollars 
In 2008, Vermont enacted the first Low-profit Limited Liability Company (L3C) 
statute. 225   Rather than creating a new form, the L3C legislation was enacted as an 
amendment to the LLC act, so as to take advantage of the LLC flexibility and of the existing 
body of law regarding its governance.226  The L3C was publicly construed as “a cross 
between a nonprofit organization and a for-profit corporation” 227  and designated as a 
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double-bottom-line entity seeking a low profit along with charitable or educational goals.228  
Since 2008, a number of States have adopted L3C statutes,229 but the Vermont L3C remains 
the most popular one. 230  While there are currently over 903 L3Cs nationwide, 231 the 
effectiveness of this model is questionable 
The main purpose of the L3C is “to signal to foundations and donor directed funds 
that entities formed under this provision intend to conduct their activities in a way that 
would qualify as program related investments.”232  This approach is obvious in the relevant 
part of the Vermont statute, which provides: 
(27) “L3C” or “low-profit limited liability company” means a person 
organized under this chapter that is organized for a business purpose that 
satisfies and is at all times operated to satisfy each of the following 
requirements: 
(A) The company: 
(i) significantly furthers the accomplishment of one or more charitable or 
educational purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B); and 
(ii) would not have been formed but for the company's relationship to the 
accomplishment of charitable or educational purposes. 
(B) No significant purpose of the company is the production of income 
or the appreciation of property; provided, however, that the fact that a 
person produces significant income or capital appreciation shall not, in 
the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a significant 
purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of 
property. 
(C) No purpose of the company is to accomplish one or more political or 
legislative purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(D) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). 
(D) If a company that met the definition of this subdivision (27) at its 
formation at any time ceases to satisfy any one of the requirements, it 
shall immediately cease to be a low-profit limited liability company, but 
by continuing to meet all the other requirements of this chapter, will 
continue to exist as a limited liability company. The name of the 
company must be changed to be in conformance with subsection 3005(a) 
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of this title.233 
Thus, L3Cs can be characterized as twofold hybrid entities.  First, they 
inherently further a double bottom line: they must be organized for a business 
purpose that significantly leads to the accomplishment of a charitable or 
educational outcome.  Second, the entity aims at combining traditional 
investments with donation funds.  
2. The Statutory Balance Between Conflicting Bottom Lines, An 
Answer to the Governance Challenge  
The hybrid L3C aims at reconciling paradigms that are inherently conflicting: the 
for-profit value maximization quest and the tax-exempt charitable mission.  Fiduciary 
duties of directors operating in these two worlds are wildly different, notably because 
nonprofit directors are focused principally on the success of the charitable mission and do 
not seek mere profit maximization.234  To avoid this conflict, where either the board is 
paralyzed or is granted so much deference as to allow departure from the charitable purpose 
– which is exactly the concern with the Benefit Corporation – the statute itself strikes the 
balance in favor of the charitable purposes.235  Indeed, the L3C must significantly further 
a charitable purpose,236 and no significant purpose must be the production of income.237  
Hence, although the L3C can distribute profits, its primary objective must be to accomplish 
its social purpose through the conduct of its business.  This statutory prioritization of the 
social mission thus goes beyond mere contractual arrangements by transforming directors’ 
fiduciary duties.238  Further, in comparison with for-profit corporations, directors are not 
only required to consider public benefit purposes, but to prioritize social outcomes over 
profit making.239 
This is consistent with the notion that social enterprises’ profits result from their 
social endeavors– profit making is authorized, even if substantial earnings stem from the 
business activity, but they must be subordinate to the social mission.  Hence the L3C 
adequately apprehends the social enterprise double bottom line, and addresses its branding 
and governance challenges.  Accordingly, the L3C allows various kinds of investors to join 
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in the venture.  Indeed, the vehicle offers “a degree of clarity and consistency that should 
provide reasonable confidence to investors, managers, creditors, policy-makers, and 
regulators that the form is legally viable for the appropriate circumstances.”240  
3. A Federal Barrier to the State Scheme: The PRI Problem 
The main purpose of the L3C legislation is to accommodate social enterprises’ 
particular need for diversified sources of funding.241  More specifically, the L3C aims at 
attracting private foundations, which would accept below market returns through PRIs, 
along with investors seeking market-rate returns.242  PRIs and grants would indeed permit 
L3Cs to pay market-rate returns to their market investors.243  This scheme is based on an 
uneven allocation of risks: foundations could accept the highest risk with the lowest return 
under the PRI, thus making the other investments more secure and attractive.244  Hence, 
the idea behind the L3C is to enable social enterprises to benefit from the “tranching of 
investments.”245  Foundations are at the bottom level, or “tranch,” of the investment scheme 
by making early high-risk low-return investments.  Then, at the middle tranch, responsible 
investors agree to below-market returns.  Eventually, these investments subsidize the upper 
tranch of the schemes, in which traditional investors are paid market-rate returns.  This 
tranching scheme, however, presupposes that the L3C statute incentivizes foundations to 
invest through PRIs.  
Therefore the whole idea behind the L3C statute is to signal to foundations and to 
the Internal Revenue Service that this vehicle qualifies as a PRI recipient, and thus to 
reduce their transactional costs.246  Indeed, the statutory language reproduces the Internal 
Revenue Code requirement: both the L3C 247  and the PRI 248  must further purposes 
described in section 170 (c)(2)(B), and no significant purpose of the company or of the 
program can be the production of income or the appreciation of property.  Nonetheless, 
although the Vermont statute replicates the language of the Internal Revenue Code and of 
the Treasury Regulation,249 it has not made it easier for foundations to invest in L3C social 
enterprises.  This is because the L3C is a state vehicle, whereas the PRI is a creature of 
federal tax law.  Thus, the Internal Revenue Service continues to rule on a case-by-case 
basis whether a particular investment qualifies as PRI, either in advance through a private 
letter ruling or after it has been made and reported.  Hence, although the L3C is a good fit 
for PRIs, the Service has no preference as to the entity that receives the investment.250 In 
other words, the Service is “structure agnostic,”251 as it only wants “to insure [sic] that the 
recipient organization uses the money for an acceptable exempt purpose and holds the 
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investing foundation responsible for monitoring compliance.”252  As a result, the reduction 
on transactional and monitoring costs has not happened.  
Despite the charitable purpose and the transparency of the L3C, state legislation 
on its own cannot create new opportunities for PRIs.  Consequently, the main interest of 
the L3C for social entrepreneurs rests in its branding aspect and the fiduciary responsibility 
of the company to further its charitable mission.  In short, L3Cs provide a legal branding 
without the burdensome structure of tax-exempt organizations.  
VII CONCLUSION: CREATIVE CAPITALISM CALLS FOR INNOVATIVE 
LEGISLATORS  
Social entrepreneurship is at the juncture of creative capitalism and social 
innovation.  It aims at combining the best of two sectors, and thus is cramped in the 
traditional vehicles designed for either world in isolation.  Although the social bottom line 
of these enterprises can usually meet the broad charitable purpose requirement of the 
Internal Revenue Code, tax-exempt vehicles have proven to be unable to host the financial 
one.  Indeed, tax-exempt nonprofits cannot distribute profits to investors if they suffer a 
burdensome federal oversight as well as substantial limitations on their activities.  
Conversely, the advantages of for-profit vehicles stem from their flexibility.  They can raise 
capital on the market and organize their ownership structure as they see fit.  They are free 
to engage in a number of activities that are either prohibited or highly regulated when 
carried out by tax-exempt nonprofits.  However, the uncertainty as to the extent to which 
social purposes can be furthered by corporations, as well as the failure of the for-profit 
world to receive funding from tax-exempts and the lack of a social enterprise brand have 
made it necessary to design new vehicles.  
Hence, the development of the social enterprise movement has caused an 
increasing number of states to “revisit a binary or 'either/or approach' to organizational 
structures.”253  Hybrid vehicles thus aim at enabling mission-driven for-profits to access a 
broad array of funding sources and to commit their capital to social endeavors.  By adopting 
hybrid vehicles, social entrepreneurs brand their enterprises as committed to public interest 
purposes, even though the degree of this commitment varies depending on the legal form 
chosen.  They further escape the significant non-distribution and disclosure constraints that 
weigh heavily on tax-exempt organizations.  Consequently, their business-like flexibility 
along with their public identification as mission-driven creatures should favor investors’ 
confidence and consumers’ loyalty.  
Nonetheless, various obstacles stand in the way of this speculative scheme.  First, 
these new forms remain widely untested by the courts.  How the balance between the two 
bottom lines will be struck is still an open question, particularly regarding the Benefit 
Corporation.  Further, there is a lack of uniformity in the forms that are authorized 
nationwide.  Different states have different answers to the social enterprise challenges: 
while some states have refused to create any hybrid form, others have adopted several 
mission-driven vehicles in their own legislation.  California, for instance, created the 
Flexible Purpose Corporation254 in addition to its Benefit Corporation255: the former offers 
greater flexibility than the latter in the furtherance of public benefits through lighter 
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qualifying and reporting constraints.256  The state of Washington followed the same trend 
with the adoption of a new type of for-profit corporation, the Social Purpose Corporation, 
as of June 7, 2012.257  In many ways, the Social Purpose Corporation looks like a lighter 
version of the Benefit Corporation as well.258  This lack of uniform approach nationwide 
results in a lessened readability of the hybrid model and make it harder for social 
entrepreneurs and their investors to navigate between the forms it encompasses.  
Consequently, the availability of nonprofit, for-profit and hybrid vehicles must be 
viewed as a menu from which social entrepreneurs can choose the form that is better suited 
for their own business model.  Because social entrepreneurship rests on an innovative 
combination of the for-profit and charitable worlds, there is hardly one legal form that 
adequately fits the whole multiplicity of its variants.  The preliminary issue that states 
should resolve is to better define social entrepreneurship, particularly regarding its mission, 
capitalizing and governance components.  Understanding these challenges is the key to 
designing an appropriate legal form.  Then, as for the state of Delaware regarding public 
corporations, the practice of these hybrid vehicles will direct social entrepreneurs and 
investors toward legislation that better reflects their expectations.  It will then be up to the 
relevant market to make its determination. After all, social entrepreneurship is just another 
creature of capitalism.  
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